System Operators' Review of Locational Signals On the Island of Ireland Workshop, Questionnaire and Industry Paper Overview

Revision 1.0





Locational Signals Document

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Approvals

Name	Date
Elaine Roberts	
Tim Hurley	
Breandan MacMathuna	
Mark Needham	
Helen Magorrian	
Raymond Skillen	
	April 30 th

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1. Introduction and Background

This document outlines the results of the research, which was conducted amongst all customers who use the Transmission Systems in Ireland and Northern Ireland regarding Tariffs and Losses. The research or fact-finding process is part of the Investigation phase for the All-Island Locational Signals Project and comes in three parts. Firstly, there was a workshop, which was held in Dundalk on March 3rd at which customers and other industry groups had an opportunity to express their views on the project. Secondly there was an on-line questionnaire and thirdly there was a call for industry papers from customers who may have detailed considerations in written form. The research findings will be used to develop an improved all-island arrangement during the Design and Implementation phase of the project.

The questionnaire is being used as a tool to identify opinion trends amongst organisations with regard to the locational signals aspects of current and potential Tariff and Losses schemes. The survey was completed by 35 of the 75 organisations targeted during February and March 2009. Of the 35, approximately three fifths (21) were generators and 14 were demand respondents. A full listing of the organisations who have participated in the questionnaire is listed in Appendix E. It is the understanding of the Project Team that the results of the questionnaire reflect the corporate positions of the respondents and not any personal opinions held by those parties who completed the survey.

The findings from the questionnaire will be used to prioritize those characteristics and criteria which are of utmost importance to the organisations surveyed. The Dominant and Secondary trends as well as Outlier views are all included in order to fully reflect the totality of opinions held. The results will provide an important input to the work that is being done on the project.

2. Workshop

The purpose of the March 3rd half day locational signals workshop was to give customers the opportunity to voice their opinions on locational signals through tariff and losses schemes. There were a number of questions and comments that were raised during the workshop in addition to the presentations, which were made by:

- IWEA
- AES
- EirGrid
- SONI
- CER & NIAUR

A list of the noted questions and responses is included in the Appendices.

3. Response to call for Industry Papers

A number of industry papers with commentary on locational signals, tariffs and losses were received by EirGrid and SONI from the following organisations:

- IWEA
- Viridian Power and Energy
- Synergen
- ESBIE
- Saorgas
- SWS (email position)

The ideas in these papers in addition to the other sources of feedback will be taken into consideration by the project team during the design phase of the project. The papers are not included in this document but are posted individually in addition to the document.

4. Questionnaire

An online form was used to reduce time spent in the collation of data and reduce the time spent by users in processing data.

A number of question types were used in the questionnaire. Where relevant a 4 point scale was used to measure the extent of a particular opinion. In other cases, a single preference was sought.

In keeping with the equality ethos of the system operators, each respondent's opinion carried the same value in terms of quantitative and qualitative analysis.

4.1. Questionnaire Results

4.2. Commentary on quantitative analysis

Each response received has been collated and included in this paper. Where the response has been part of a quantitative question, it is included in graphical form in section 4.9. The accompanying comments are in the Appendices however, a general commentary is included.

4.3. Comments

A full listing of each and every comment made by respondents is included in the Appendices.

4.4. Questions and Reponses

Section 4.9 includes full listing of the quantitative analysis of each and every question.

4.5. Completion Rate

35 customers completed the questionnaire from a potential 75 giving a response rate of 47%. Note that certain representative organisations e.g. IWEA have completed the questionnaire on behalf of a number of its members who did not complete the questionnaire themselves.

4.6. Location and Business

The location of the respondents is included in Figure 1. In certain cases and where possible, the respondents chose not to respond to certain questions.




Figure 1: Responses by location of main business

5. Main business(es): (you may chos	e more than one option)	
	Response Percent	Response Count
Thermal Generation	45.7%	16
Renewable Generation	42.9%	15
Demand Side Units	5.7%	2
Supplier Damand Customer	34.3%	12
Autoproducer	5.7%	2
	answered question	35
	skipped question	0

Figure 2: Main business of respondents

4.7. Quantitative Results

Certain questions used in the questionnaire allow quantitative analysis to be used to measure the extent to which a particular opinion is held by the body of customers. These questions are presented in the report in graphical form with supporting analysis.

4.8. Qualitative Results

One feature of the questionnaire and the tariff/losses development process as a whole, is the need to reflect diverging and at times unique perspectives on the locational signals issue. Each question that contained a box has its entire list of comments included in the Appendices.

4.9. Results

The following sections provide a graphic representation of the answers to individual questions relating to Generation Tariffs, Demand Tariffs and Losses.

4.9.1. Generation Tariffs

$\boldsymbol{\delta}_{i}$ in your opinion, the current Generator Transmission tariff arrangements in your jurisdiction are:				
			Response Percent	Response Count
Acceptable			19.0%	4
Unacceptable			81.0%	17
		Plea	se state why	21
		answere	d question	21
		skippe	ed question	14

Figure 3: Acceptability of current tariff arrangements

7. Do you believe that locational signals are an important element of Generator TUoS tariffs?				
			Response Percent	Response Count
Yes			19.0%	4
No			81.0%	17
		Plea	se state why	21
		answere	ed question	21
		skipp	ed question	14

Figure 4: Significance of Locational Signals

8. In your opinion should a harmonized all-island arrangement be used for determining Generator TUoS tariffs?			
		Response Percent	Response Count
Yes		95.2%	20
No	-	4.8%	1
	Pleas	e state why:	20
	answere	d question	21
	skippe	ed question	14

Figure 5: Need for harmonization between Northern Ireland and Ireland

9. Please rate the importance of the following objectives in setting Generator Tariffs on the Island of Ireland:					
	Not Important	Slightly Important	Important	Very Important	Response Count
Transparency	0.0% (0)	4.8% (1)	28.6% (6)	66.7% (14)	21
Stability (Low volatility)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	14.3% (3)	85.7 % (18)	21
Predictability	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	14.3% (3)	85.7% (18)	21
Fairness/Equity	0.0% (0)	4.8% (1)	33.3% (7)	61.9% (13)	21
Cost Reflective	4.8% (1)	33.3% (7)	42.9% (9)	19.0% (4)	21
			ai	nswered question	21
				skipped question	14

Figure 6: Importance of various generator objectives




Figure 7: Appropriateness of a shallow charging regime

12. In your opinion, how significant an impact would locational signals through generator TUoS tariffs have on the choice of location? Tick as appropriate:			
		Response Percent	Response Count
Not Significant		61.9%	13
Slightly significant		19.0%	4
Significant		9.5%	2
Very significant		9.5%	2
	answere	d question	21
	skippe	ed question	14

Figure 8: Significance of Generation Tariff on choice of location

13. In your opinion, is the current arrangement of recovering 75% and 25% of transmission network or generators respectively appropriate?	osts from supp	ollers and
	Response Percent	Response Count
Appropriate	33.3%	7
Inappropriate	66.7%	14
Please state what you believe would be a more appropriate split		17
answe	red question	21
skip	oed question	14

Figure 9: Generator's response regarding split between Suppliers and Generators

14. At present generators connected to the distribution system with installed capacity less than 10MW do not have to pay Generator TUoS tariffs. In your opinion is this threshold reasonable?				
		Response Percent	Response Count	
Yes		61.9%	13	
No		38.1%	8	
	If no, please indicate a more appropriate threshold	or treatment	10	
answered question		21		
skipped question			14	

Figure 10: Threshold Limit

15. Should new entrants be treated in the same way as existing generators with respect to Generator TUoS charges?		
	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	85.7%	18
No	14.3%	3
Please comment	If necessary	13
answer	ed question	21
skipp	ed question	14

Figure 11: Treatment of existing and new entrants

4.9.2. Demand Tariffs

17. In your opinion, the current Demand/Supplier Transmission tariff arrangements in your jurisdiction are:			
		Response Percent	Response Count
Acceptable		35.7%	5
Unacceptable		64.3%	9
	answere	d question	14
	skippe	ed question	21

Figure 12: Acceptability of current Demand Tariff arrangements




Figure 13: Harmonization of Demand/Supplier Tariffs

20. Please rate the importance of the following objectives in setting Demand/Supplier Tariffs on the island of Ireland:					
	Not Important	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Response Count
Transparency	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	13.3% (2)	86.7% (13)	15
Stability (Low Volatility)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	46.7% (7)	53.3% (8)	15
Predictability	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	46.7% (7)	53.3% (8)	15
Fairness/Equity	0.0% (0)	6.7% (1)	40.0% (6)	53.3% (8)	15
Cost Reflective	6.7% (1)	13.3% (2)	20.0% (3)	60.0% (9)	15
			a	nswered question	15
				skipped question	20

Figure 14: Importance of various Demand/Supplier objectives




Figure 15: Postage stamp option for island of Ireland

23. In your opinion, is the current arr generators respectively appropriate	angement of recovering 75% and 25% of transmission network co ?	sts from supp	ollers and
		Response Percent	Response Count
Yes		26.7%	4
No		73.3%	11
	What would a more approp	rlate split be:	10
	answer	ed question	15
	skipp	ed question	20

Figure 16: Split between suppliers and generators

24. Do you believe that Demand/Supplier TUoS should be based on the following:		
	Response Percent	Response Count
Capacity only	13.3%	2
Energy only	33.3%	5
Capacity and Energy	53.3%	8
Pleas	se state why:	11
answere	ed question	15
skipp	ed question	20

Figure 17: Capacity/Energy Split

25. In your opinion, if the costs of serving different locations differ, is different locations?	it reasonable that different demand charges are app	olied to
		sponse Count
Yes	13.3%	2
No	86.7%	13
	Please state why:	11
	answered question	15
	skipped question	20

Figure 18: Different Demand charges for different regions

28. In your opinion are the current TL	AF arrangements in your jurisdiction:	
	Response Percent	Response Count
Acceptable	30.4%	7
Unacceptable	69.6%.	16
	answered question	23
	skipped question	12

Figure 19: Current Losses arrangements

30. Do you believe that Locational Sig	nals are an important element of TLAFs?	
	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes	26.1%	6
No	73.9%	17
	Please state why:	22
	answered question	23
	skipped question	12

Figure 20: Importance of locational signals

31. In your opionion is it reasonable th	nat losses be attributed on the basis they are incurred?		
		Response Percent	Response Count
Yes		34.8%	8
No		65.2%	15
	Please	ə statə why:	20
	answere	d question	23
	skippe	d question	12

Figure 21: Basis in which losses are attributed




Figure 22: Harmonization of TLAFs

33. Please rate the significance of the following objectives in setting TLAFs on the island of Ireland:					
	Not important	Slightly Important	Important	Very Important	Response Count
Transparency	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	34.8% (8)	65.2% (15)	23
Stability (Low Volatility)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	18.2% (4)	81.8% (18)	22
Predictability	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	21.7% (5)	78.3% (18)	23
Faimess/Equity	0.0% (0)	4.3% (1)	34.8% (8)	60.9% (14)	23
Cost Reflective	8.7% (2)	39.1% (9)	30.4% (7)	21.7% (5)	23
				answered question	23
				skipped question	12

Figure 23: Importance of various Losses objectives

35. In your opinion, how significant an impact would locational signals through TLAFs have on the choice of location? Tic appropriate:				
		Response Percent	Response Count	
Not Significant		56.5%	13	
Slightly significant		17.4%	4	
Significant		21.7%	5	
Very significant	=	4.3%	1	
	answere	ed question	23	
skipped question		12		

Figure 24: Significance of locational signals on choice of Demand/Supplier location

36. In your opinion, should tranmissi	on losses be allocated to:		
		Response Percent	Response Count
generators entirely	-	8.7%	2
demand/suppliers entirely		43.5%	10
shared between generators & demand/suppliers		47.8%	11
	If shared what should the ratio be between generators and dema	nd/suppliers	11
	answere	ed question	23
	skipp	əd quəstion	12

Figure 25: Allocation of losses.

Appendix A

Comments Raised During Workshop on March 3rd

<u>Name</u>	Organisation	Query/Comment
Iain Wright	Airtricity	 How do TLAFs give a locational signal at all as they change the incentive from year to year? On NI TUOS – [Airtricity] struggle to understand the benefit of the degree of granularity in the current methodology. Should the System Operators consider moving away from charges on a legacy network to MEA method Also noted that with further interconnection on the Island, would benefit UK and further afield therefore costs should not fall entirely on Irish consumers.
Garrett Blayney	Viridian	 There are 2 decisions made in the life cycle of the plant – (i) to execute a CA (ii) to close a plant when no longer economic 1. [Viridian] don't feel that the current tariff structure formed part of either decision 2. In the current climate with capital in short supply, risk has a large impact on the cost of capital, and hence an impact on the consumer
Peter Harte	SWS	 [SWS] asked about the possibility of providing a forward projection of total Transmission spend to help with transparency There was no mention of Grid25 in the project introduction, which was introducing decisions on where to build the network and care should be taken to ensure that the locational signal didn't counteract the area being developed and therefore disable the ability of the developer to accept a CA due to a poor TLAF for example.
Shane Lynch	AES	 Why is a signal so poor for Kilroot for example when it is within 13 miles of a large load centre like Belfast (0.97 on avg vs 1.0 avg ROI) Would it be possible to have a working party for the project to ensure close engagement The €4bn investment under Grid25 was an EirGrid/RA decision. Decisions on cost control are not with the generators.
Paddy Larkin	Moyle	 In correction to S Lynch comment – Moyle imports pay TUoS to get on/off GB system and exports pay TUoS pay TUoS to get off Irish system Referred to Reg 1228/2003? Which states that there are no costs for the NI-ROI flow as this would pose a barrier to competition
A number of other comments made		Would it be possible to address if the Shallow connection methodology would be revisited

Name	Organisation	Query/Comment
where the speakers name was not		
given		

Appendix B

Comments on Generation Questions

In your opinion, the surrout	
In your opinion, the current	
Generator Transmission tariff	
arrangements in your jurisdiction	
are:	Response
	AAL consider that the Autoproducer tariff category is an acceptable arrangement for this company.
	However, in general, it is considered that since the cost is ultimately borne by the consumer of the
Acceptable	electricity, the TUOS would be better levied on the consumer, to cut out administrative cost.
	These are in operation for the past nine years and are generally regarded as satisfactory to date.
	However, with the high level of wind penetration they may need to be modified, but we haven't given
	this serious consideration. In general, they should only be changed if there is strong reason for doing -
	change for the sake of change should not happen. On an operational level there is an argument for
	bringing the transmission MIC TUoS charges (expressed in kW) into synch with the distribution MIC
Acceptable	DUoS charges (expressed in kVA); they should both be expressed in kVA terms
	Acceptable as based on the historic costs of the network that is socialised across generators.
	However, even without locational signals being imposed, there is a risk to incumbents from significant
	spends on upgrading the network. Currently, it is our understanding that these would be passed
	through to generators. However, as TUoS is regarded as a fixed cost, there is no opportunity to pass
	any additional costs through and they are therefore they are a direct hit on the generators bottom
	line. It is this type of future risk that makes investment decisions more difficult and risky with the
Acceptable	knock-on issues of higher capital risk / costs.

In your opinion, the current	
Generator Transmission tariff	
arrangements in your jurisdiction	
are:	Response
	They ensure costs incurred in the jurisdiction are recovered from participants in the jurisdiction and
	therefore raise no issues with regard to political or regulatory obligations (and costs) imposed in the
	other jurisdiction (e.g with regard to renewables arrangements, planning requirements, etc.) are not
	passed across to participants and/or customers in the jurisdiction. This is particularly relevant were
	there are EU obligations on member states which may be implemenmted differently with differing
Acceptable	impacts on transmission investment costs.
	The current framework produces highly volatile factors that have a disproportionate impact on
	participants. They are not based on an enduring network so cannot send meaningful investment
Unacceptable	signals. The risk they create adds to the investment cost of all players.
Unacceptable	Localised charges serve no purpose except to increase the project risk for new generation.
	The locational signal has now become disfunctional and current arrangements significantly increase
Unacceptable	investment risk.
	locational signalling of this nature does not work with this type of application. It would be much better
	to return to the model whereby UoS charging is applied to the demand customer - this is ultimately
Unacceptable	who pays for it in any event and it avoids all the current unnecessary complexity
Unacceptable	Please see separate response to consultation.

In your opinion, the current	
Generator Transmission tariff	
arrangements in your jurisdiction	
<u>are:</u>	Response
	The costs should be uniform and not locationally based. 1. Location-based charging has the effect of
	penalising wind-generation, given that the resource is by its nature, far from the areas of better-
	developed infrastructure. 2. The fact that the grid is weak in certain areas is not the fault of those
	who are looking to connect to the grid. It is the fault of the system developer (ESB). Therefore, it is
	not justifiable to try to re-coup costs incurred for an historical failure from prospective users, be they
	generators or consumers. 3. Investment conditions are weakened by having an arbitrarily variable
Unacceptable	parameter that has a direct effect on revenue.
	The current arrangements are based on socialising fixed opex costs and fixed (and sunk) capex costs
	on a jurisdictional basis, allocated 75%/25% between generation/demand respectivley. We support
	the jurisdictional allocation of these fixed costs because (i) each jurisdiction will have different
	regulatory price controls (e.g. different allowed rates of return) and (ii) different network investment
	programmes designed to facilitate both local energy policy and other local public policies like regional
	economic development (e.g. as highlighted in Grid 25). We support socialising fixed and sunk
	costs becasue (i) to do otherwise would result in a loss of static economic efficiency (these costs do
	not change if a generator or customer changes its location), and (ii) all users enjoy the benefit of the
	entire network at some time or other. There does not appear to be any economic basis for the
	25%/75% split and we do not support this. All fixed and sunk network costs must ultimately be paid
	for by customers. It is more statically efficient to directly levy 100% of these fixed and sunk costs on
	demand rather that indirectly via the energy market and CPM. We understand thta thi sis the
Unacceptable	approach adopted in many other markets.

In your opinion, the current	
Generator Transmission tariff	
arrangements in your jurisdiction	
are:	Response
	The current Generator Transmission tariffs are unpredictable and volatile. For a new generator
	entering the market there is no way of predicting the TUoS costs one will incur. There is a wide
	disparity between contestable and non contestable costs which feed into the calculation of TUoS
	charges and this is difficult to understand. Significant year on year volatility of TUoS charges
Unacceptable	increases regulatory risk and uncertainty and therefore increases commercial risk.
	The primary difficulties we have with the current generator transmission tariff arrangements are their
	year on year volatility, and the lack of predictability associated with them. When making long term
	generation investment decisions it is crucial that all cost inputs may be accurately modelled over a
	long period. Under the current system of TUoS charges it is impossible to predict what the tariff for a
	given generator will be annually, as they can be subject to significant and unpredictable change each
Unacceptable	year. These swings can have a substantial impact on projected returns.
	Primarily the arrangements in the RoI cannot form an acceptable basis of generator transmission
	charging whilst they are not harmonised with those in NI – especially when the future harmonisation
Unacceptable	of the arrangements was one of the underpinning principles of the SEM when implemented.
	They significantly increase investment risk for generators, and do not provide a locational signal. We
	suggest that locational signals should be provided by a clear connection agreement policy, where
	generators are only given firm connections when deep works are complete, and that generators with
Unacceptable	firm connections are dispatched in advance of non-firm generators.
	The process by which the charges are calculated is not transparent and brings about charges that are
Unacceptable	not predictable, nor stable.
Unacceptable	PG considers that a review of Generator TUoS tariffs is timely

In your opinion, the current	
Generator Transmission tariff	
arrangements in your jurisdiction	
are:	Response
	As wind penetration levels rise, the need for a more [system needs] driven set of signals will be
	required to steer the new generator investment decisions away from the current [flat rate] type
	decision making process. This may require some quite strong early signals to make an impression on
	the market. If the SO is serious about securing complementary generation plant to match off the
	peculiarities of wind then short medium and longer term signals need to be published setting out the
	scale of the potential cost involved in following BAU approach V.S. a differential Generator TUoS
	approach. Assuming the cost of both the capital investment in transmission assets and the operational
Unacceptable	uplift associated with a BAU approach can be estimated from the ITC modelling.
	There are two significant issues with the current methodology (i) The 'scenario' approach to
	estimating 'use of system' does not reflect real dispatch patterns, and in particular, has the potential
	to discriminate against units with low annual load factors (ii) The levels of cost for new network
	infrastructure are very high, and in particular, the increase in the levels of these costs which are
	suggested in the 2008 paper on proposed all-island tarriffs suggesting increases of more that 100%
	on the current RoI methodology. A new system will have to address these issues, and in particular
Unacceptable	allow for some independent estimate of network infrastructure costs.

In your opinion, the current	
Generator Transmission tariff	
arrangements in your jurisdiction	
are:	Response
	Not properly recoverable through the SEM, as bids cannot reflect TUoS charges. BNE methodology
	provides contribution through capacity charge, but it is wrong to have to recover differences via
	inframarginal rent. Postalisation is far more straightforward and ensures economic signals are
	consistent throughout the commercial market arrangements. There is also an argument that all
Unacceptable	charges are paid by customers in the end, so demand users should pay all Transmission charges.
	too volatile and do not provide a suitable locational signal. You cannot predict the charges in the
Unacceptable	future. It is not necessarily fair that some generators have high charges and some have no charges

Do you believe that locational signals are an important element of	
Generator TUoS tariffs?	Responses
	Yes, but only because they are unhelpful. Nodal charging, based on complicated mathematical studies may have many theoretical attractions, but attribution of the resulting calculated costs, in a complex system with many participants, is a joint cost allocation problem. As such cause, effect and
Yes	timing are by no means as clear cut and fair as the theoreticians might hope.
	The locational signals incentivise new generator entrants with regard to locating new plants. Both the locational capacity charges and the TLAFs rightly give the right signals; this is right for Ireland Inc in
Yes	terms of reducing transmission losses and the cost of grid infrastructure.

Do you believe that locational	
signals are an important element of	
Generator TUoS tariffs?	Responses
	To influence the choice of, electrical characteristics of and fuelling options for the incoming fleet of
Yes	new generators that will be required up to and beyond 2030.
	It is acknowledged that Locational signals are important to efficiently focus planning and construction
	of generators. However the current volatility of the TUOS is unlikely to be of use to investors.
	Furthermore the complexity of determination of the TUOS charge make it difficult to forecast for the
Yes	purposes of investment planning
	The Irish energy market is being centrally planned through the connection process. Participants are
	not reasonably in a position to respond to these signals. Also the signals take no account of strategic
	grid development goals and lack stability. There have been significant year on year changes to
No	existing participants which only serves to increase the risk profile of future projects.
Νο	The locational signalling is much too crude to have the desired effect in this type of application
	Generator TUoS charges do not provide locational signals to new generators which would cause them
No	to actually act on such signals in practice. Please see seperate response to consultation
	The location of a generator should not be reflected in the Use of System charges. This penalises
	renewables in favour of fossil-fuel burning plants, when the stated objective of the government is the
No	opposite. It introduces a direct and blatant policy contradiction.
	As regards new entrants there are fars bigger factors than TUOS that go into choosing a proposed
	site. One of the biggest being the possibility of a grid connection in a reasonable time. The Grid 25 is
	largely planning where best to put new generation. Consequently Localised TUOS charging doesn't
Νο	send out any signal that parties can respond to.

Do you believe that locational	
signals are an important element of	
Generator TUoS tariffs?	Responses
	The objective is to encourage generators to locate where the incremental capex for network
	reinforcement is least. To answer the question, we must therefore consider if locational TUoS signals
	will ensure this outcome. Firstly, network reinforcements in the RoI will be proactively decided via
	Grid 25, rather that reactively in response to connection applications. Grid 25 will build the network
	based on pre-determined assumptions about where generators (thermal and renewable) will locate.
	Therefore locational signals are effectively redundant. Furthermore, having published and
	implemented this plan, it should be very obvious to generators where they should locate. If
	generators insist on locating where additional reinforcment is required (beyond the Grid 25 plan) then
	they should be charged the deep reinforcement cost, or at least some form of cost/benefit Grid
	Investment Test should be carried out. We note that this review appears to rule out a change to the
	current shallow connection policy, but no explanation has thus far been given for this approach. We
	consider this to be a major shortfall and would encourage an early review of this decision.
	Secondly, a locational signal is only effeictive if it is derived from the right information. In this case,
	what matters is minimising future reinforcement costs. However, these are not even considered for
	different potential injection nodes in deriving locational TUoS charges. Rather the signal is based on
	existing sunk costs. As we have seen from the Kilroot example which we presented at the recent
	workshop, this can result in perserve outcomes. There is significant evidence in the literature to
	support this point. Finally, for a small system like Ireland, entry/exit movements and centrally
	planned grid reinforcement will result in material volatility in year-on-year TUoS charges. This
	combined with a lack of transparancy and subjectivity around dispatch scenarios, etc. results in a lack
No	of trust and confidence. This in turn requires significant regulation and increases the cost of capital.
Νο	TUoS charges are a factor in choice of location in Generation. However other factors such as land,

Do you believe that locational	
signals are an important element of	
Generator TUoS tariffs?	Responses
	access to water and proximity to the electricity grid and gas network are more important factors. In
	the case of wind the location of the site in sufficiently windy areas is the critical factor and not the
	strength or weakness of the grid or localisaed loads
	In the current climate of investment in both generation and the transmission and distribution network
	it is hard to justify the inclusion of locational signals as part of the TUoS tariffs. Wind generators have
	little real choice as to where they locate on the system for two main reasons: • The primary
	locational factors for wind generators are the availability of the wind resource, and planning
	permissions. The location of the best wind regimes cannot be altered, so generation must move to
	these areas. • When wind generators apply to be connected to the network in a given location they
	are instructed as part of the gate process of connection by Eirgrid/ESB Networks as to which node on
	the system they must connect to. With the current gates as they stand even if the generator wishes to
	move to an area with a better locational signal (i.e. more favourable TUoS charges and TLAF) they will
	effectively be precluded from doing so for years, as the gates are processed in date order, and the
	generators new application will be at the back of the queue. The real choice of the generator is very
	limited by these long connection lead times. • Further to this, if the generator were finally successful
	in moving location to an area with a better signal, there is every chance that this signal could have
	changed significantly for the worse by the time the generator is actually connected to the system.
	The above factors are the main locational drivers for generators, and it is fair to say that the locational
	element of generator TUoS tariffs have minimal impact on the decisions of generators. It is difficult
	enough for generators to locate their sites according to the above criteria, without the additional
No	penalising factors of volatile locational signals being applied through use of system charges.
Νο	They have only limited bearing on the investment decision and if they are volatile, may only serve to

Do you believe that locational	
signals are an important element of	
Generator TUoS tariffs?	Responses
	increase the cost of capital and hence overall cost for customers. We also consider that the "shallow
	connection policy" has a much larger bearing on the matter and we believe that as well as reviewing
	the GTUos and TLAF issues, the decision to adopt a shallow connection policy should also be re-
	opened. The strategic objective must be to minimise the cost of electricity for customers. It is not
	clear that by adopting a shallow connection policy, it leads to the most efficient (least cost) investment
	decisions when the often the party making the decision is not seeing the full cost. Therefore we
	recommend that all transmission factors are reassessed.
	Long term historic locational decisions have been taken – locational charging through TUoS has no
	impact on existing decisions, and provides no signal an existing player can react to. • Regarding
	new investment, TUOS is at best a second order determinant for a new entry's choice of location. •
	The Grid 25 initiative represents an increasingly centrally planned approach to connecting new
	generation schemes. In this context, locational signals through TUOS for existing and new entrants
No	appears to be an increasingly marginal signal.
	Their volatile and opaque nature creates a non-diversifiable risk that increases generator cost of
No	capital but does not provide a stable locational signal.
	Locational signals aimed at encouraging generation investment to specific areas cannot work when the
	investment period for a generator is taken into consideration. Locational signals are transient and
	change as rapidly as the transmission system changes and therefore provide no relevant signal to an
No	investor.
No	Locational signals are important, but not necessarily in this format
	For a thermal generator there are more significant / overriding locational elements such as:
No	Planning Consents (Article 39) including environmental considerations - Fuel supply / replenishment -

Do you believe that locational	
signals are an important element of	
Generator TUoS tariffs?	Responses
	Cooling water supply and adequate heat sink for rejected heat Existing infrastructure It is our
	belief that when all these locational factors are satisfied, it is highly unlikely that there will be a choice
	of sites available where locational TUoS charges would be a deciding factor.
	The duration of the grid connection process and project development life cycles coupled with the
	granularity of the market which gives rise to significant volatility in TUoS and TLAFs, as new units
	come online, old units are retired, and new grid infrastructure is rolled out, completely undermine the
No	basis for these mechanisms giving an effective locational signal
No	For wind generation there is not a substantial choice in the location of the best wind sites

In your opinion should a	
harmonized all-island	
arrangement be used for	
determining Generator	
TUoS tariffs?	Response
Yes	There should be an all-island strategy for investment and development.
Yes	Harmonization of charges across both jurisdictions is part of the objectives of the AIM.
Yes	An all-island harmonised approach should create a more stable investment case.
Yes	Equity and fairness
Yes	Schedule & Dispatch of generation is harmonised to reflect the operation a single pool arrangement for generation pricing - so it seems to make sense that the same is done for TUoS pricing.
Yes	This is the ideal, but the detail of this would need to be agreed so as to ensure the criteria below are met.
Yes	There is no reason not to have an all-island arrangement. Indeed, it should strengthen the infrastructure.

In your opinion should a	
harmonized all-island	
arrangement be used for	
determining Generator	
TUoS tariffs?	Response
	Yes, considering that we have an all-island market, this makes eminently good sense. However, it is
	understandable that a different jurisdiction would want to structure its own tariffs to suit itself and this might be at
	odds with the interessts of RoI. But assuming there will be progressive integration in the future then a harmonized
Yes	arrangement should be pursued.
	On balance, yes, because this means that stakeholders only need to understand one system. However,
	harmonisation is not necessary to achieve economic efficiency. We are dealing here with fixed ans sunk costs
	which do not effect the dispatch process. Therefore the different jurisdictions could adopt different allocations for
	cost recovery if they wanted to do so. For example, the RoI has decided to invest in the network to facilitate a
	40% renewable target and regional economic development. TUos price increases are estimated at 20-30%. Given
Yes	this significance, its possible that NI and RoI may well wish to adopt different cost recovery allocations.
Yes	For the SEM to function effectively arrangements should be harmonised in an equitable and fair manner.
	As we are now in an all island market for both energy and capacity it is appropriate that all market charges be
	applied on an island wide basis. In the interests of fairness, and to demonstrate full commitment to an all island
	approach, it is appropriate that a common approach is taken, where there is convergence of elements that are not
Yes	yet harmonised.
	This was a set RAs policy and we believe that it should be implemented as soon as practically possible. There is no
	rationale for not harmonising arrangements based on historic network configurations – or other jurisdictional
	factors. There are many other costs / prices within the SEM that could be set more efficiently on a jurisdictional
Yes	basis (i.e. regional energy pricing) but have been rejected. Consistency and equity dictate that common TUOS

In your opinion should a	
harmonized all-island	
arrangement be used for	
determining Generator	
TUoS tariffs?	Response
	arrangements should be implemented with the minimum of delay.
Yes	An all-island approach will limit jurisidictional differences and create a bigger, more stable, market for generators to invest in.
	As generators are now competing commercially on an all-island basis, it follows that all charges levied on generators be calculated according to a common methodology. A harmonized approach to determining charges would prevent generators from being disadvantaged by less penal levies being charged in a neighbouring
Yes	jurisdiction.
Yes	Since the market is harmonised/ being harmonised in most other areas, TUoS tariffs should also be harmonised In order to balance out any supplier driven incentive to enter Cfd's with a generator which will induce an imbalance
	across any interconnection, thus producing the basis for a constraint payment that would not otherwise have
Yes	arisen.

In your opinion should a	
harmonized all-island	
arrangement be used for	
determining Generator	
TUoS tariffs?	Response
	As far as possible, all generators should be competing on an equal footing. We appreciate that different locations
	may necessitate different infrastructure costs such as extensions to transmission network, gas transmission
	network etc. We believe these costs should ideally be socialised or at least be a one-off cost that they can be built
	into a projects construction cost and hence be assessed as part of the overall project viability. It is unacceptable to
	us that an incumbents margin is eroded significantly due to the actions of others (i.e. under the harmonised
Yes	proposals, another generation project could significantly increase TUoS charges).
	Any mechanisms associated with the market, which could give rise to distortion of the market through different
Yes	treatment in the two jurisdictions should be harmonised, where possible.
	Only if the methodology is sensible, fair and can maintain these attributes in a developing system. The SEM
	operates as an all-island system and the TSO's are supposed to co-ordinate operation across the jurisdictions, so it
Yes	would be perverse to create different economic signals north and south.
	As previously noted, there may be different political objectives behind much of the new transmission investment
	and it is not clear how harmonised arrangements can be developed which ensures the costs of these decisions are
	bounded within the jurisdictions making those decisions. It may be fine if both jurisdictions were to adopt common
No	policies but that has not been the case to date (e.g. plans to meet renewable & CO2 targets).

In addition to the list above, what other objectives should be taken into account when determining the Generator TUoS methodology?

The signals should ideally reflect costs but there is no point in making an attempt at this in a way that does not really reflect the underlying cost properly and ends up introducing spurious volatility. Do not add additional and unnecessary risk to generation projects as this only increases the cost to finance the projects and therefore the cost to the consumer.

It is acknowledged that the charges are to recover the cost of capital and maintenance on the network however the period over which the cost is recovered for ROI should be minimum 30 years and not 10 years, because realistically the lifetime of the asset is longer than 10 years. Furthermore ROI should make maximum use of any infrastructural funding from EU to cover network upgrade projects

Ease of application

Cost minimisation - Very Important Direct and relevant costs only included - Important

Promotion of renewables. This is supposed to be the primary objective of the country's energy policy.

It should be logical - there should be some broadly-based rationale. Players find it difficult to understand matters when they see parties "making it up as they go along"; the process loses respect in these circumstances

Economic efficiency - do they serve to minimise investment costs in both generation (cost of capital) and network reinforcement?

Long term view - the methodology should be designed for the Irish Grid of the future which will incorporate a diversity of generation across the island of Ireland. This long term view should incoporate government policy on decentraisation of industry so that there is a more integrated approach to the grid developing in less developed areas. This development of industry could then be complementary to Generation (specifically Wind) as it is generally in area of low industry concentration. The corollary being a potential reduction in system losses and greater grid

In addition to the list above, what other objectives should be taken into account when determining the Generator TUOS methodology? utilisation. The objective of aiding the achievement of Government and EU renewable generation targets should be taken into account when determining the methodology used. The locational constraints placed on wind generation should also be borne in mind. An key objective must be to ensure the tariff can deliver the desired behaviours and outcomes, e.g. if it an objective is to signal the best location to locate, can/does the tariff in isolation deliver that outcome? Synergen does not believe that a locational signal is required in the TUOS charging arrangements (see responses to other questions). However, if there were to be a locational signal, the net benefit of any locational signal should be demonstrated – i.e. it should be shown that the differential allocation of costs: • drives future locational decisions; • reflects underlying cost imposed; and • generators are able to fully reflect such cost in their bids under the bidding rules (i.e. the price signal can be responded to). This relates to the recovery of TUOS charges by generator – which is via CPM payments. The present arrangements account for TUOS charges in the establishment of BNE costs (such costs being locational). Recovery of these locationally differentiated costs on generators is then via CPM payments (which are not locational). Hence, there is an inconsistent approach to locational signals between the calculation of BNE and the recovery of TUOS charges (based on availability – which is not locationally rewarded). Methodology should be simplified If Ireland is to be a high wind system, up to and beyond the 43% level then the high desirability [assuming that it is desirable] of locating peaking type plant alongside or close to the windfarm should be signalled. A further Objective should therefore include a wind maximisation objective. There must be clarity around what elements are included. for instance: - - Is it only the current asset base. - How are future enhancements to be treated. - What is the rate of return for the asset owner.

In addition to the list above, what other objectives should be taken into account when determining the Generator TUoS methodology?

It is very important that we address the issue of Network Efficiency or Value for Money. This objective should address the questions, Are we developing the grid to achieve the best value in capital expenditure, to ensure adequate safety and security of supply? Is the TSO adequately incentivised to make best use of the grid through appropriate dispatch patterns? and Is it appropriate that every plant should require the levels of grid reinforcements to allow full firm financial access, regardless of the load factor of the plant?

Need to maintain a balance between grid charging that tries to control generation and the wider national imperatives that require generation development. Also need toensure that generators are not penalised for changes in demand

In your opinion, with a shallow charging	
regime in place, would a postage stamp i.e.	
uniform charge, be appropriate on the	Response
island of Ireland?	
	A uniform charge would not include the locational signals generated by the current system
No	
No	The quasi vertically integrated entities would invest on a non system optimal basis.
No	This option needs further investigation but should not be discounted at this stage
	Unless it is possible to develop a stable mechanism that provides investment signals that a
	generator can respond to and that meaningfully reflect the expected roll out of grid then any
Yes	signal is only adding volatility.
	Localised charges serve no purpose except to increase the project risk for new generation. A
	postage stamp approach would significantly reduce risk and a level playing pitch for all
Yes	

In your opinion, with a shallow charging	
regime in place, would a postage stamp i.e.	
uniform charge, be appropriate on the	Response
island of Ireland?	
	players. The current regime favors portfolio players who can distribute their TUOS charge
	risk.
	This is the only way to promote investment in areas where the infrastructure is weak.
Yes	Otherwise the system will be developed to cater for a market that has ceased to exist.
	I say yes, but am unaware of whether this breaches the principle of cost reflectivity. So,
Yes	difficult to answer this but leaning to yes.
	The question appears to imply that if generators are not charged deep reinforcements costs,
	then a locational charge must be applied. A locational charge can act as an alternative to
	charging for deep reinfiorcement costs but this is only effective if the charge is based on
	relative incrementral capex costs at each node. The SEM proposal is based on existing sunk
Yes	capex costs.
	A uniform charge would be appropriate with the continuation of the shallow charging regime.
Yes	

In your opinion, with a shallow charging	
regime in place, would a postage stamp i.e.	
uniform charge, be appropriate on the	<u>Response</u>
island of Ireland?	
	A uniform type charge would help to reduce the volatility of the TUoS charges, as a postalised
	type tariff would be spread over the whole system, and should vary less year on year as
	incremental changes are made to the network as a whole. Additionally, as mentioned in
	previous questions, the influence of the locational signal provided by the TUoS tariff is largely
	irrelevant to decisions made by wind generators when they decide where to locate. Other
	factors are much more relevant and as such the TUoS revenue would be better collected
	under a postalised tariff. The success of postalised transmission tariffs can be seen in the
	national gas transmission network. This type of tariff should be calculated using a simple
Yes	methodology, and could be more easily modelled and predicted by generators.
	A generator or customers generally only makes 2 decisions, to locate at a particular location
	and to cease operation. For the duration of time between these 2 decisions, the user cannot
	change matters other than to expedite the closure decision. However that is not generally a
	feasible option when the initial investment is usually a substantive one (e.g. to construct a
	generating station). Hence locational signals between these 2 critical events are largely
Yes	nugatory.
	As already stated we are not convinced that the existing charging regime in the context of the
	SEM design and regulation provides an efficient price signal that drives the locational
	decisions it seeks to influence. See comments regarding question 2.5 on the recovery of
Yes	TUOS costs by generators.
	Becuase it will increase stability and reduce investor risk, thus reducing the cost of building
Yes	new generators.

In your opinion, with a shallow charging	
regime in place, would a postage stamp i.e.	
uniform charge, be appropriate on the	Response
island of Ireland?	
	More analysis is required on this, but it seems likely that postalised charges are more
Yes	appropriate for this market
Yes	Please see Q3.
	A postage stamp approach is preferred to a locational charge, which is not effective for the
	reasons previously stated, and has the potential to be unfair to developers who have
	committed financially to a project, and are penalised for issues that are not of their making
	Non with-standing the method of apportioning charges, the absolute level of network costs,
	and the efficient use of the capital spend on grid infrastructure are critial objectives which
Yes	have to be addressed
	in my opinion yes
Yes	

In your opinion, is the current arrangement	
of recovering 75% and 25% of transmission	
network costs from suppliers and	
generators respectively appropriate?	Response
	Since all costs revert eventually to the supplier (and hence the end consumer of electricity),
	there is only value in applying them to generation if there is some value gained (e.g. a better
	dispatch). The administration costs of the TLAF and TUoS system should be taken into
Inappropriate	account in this split. Consideration should be given of simply allocating these charges to

In your opinion, is the current arrangement	
of recovering 75% and 25% of transmission	
network costs from suppliers and	
generators respectively appropriate?	Response
	demand.
Inappropriate	Suppliers should pay 100%.
Inappropriate	costs should be 100% supplier
Inappropriate	100% cost to end users
Inappropriate	100% demand customer
Inappropriate	100% to Suppliers, or min of 90%. Greater Transparency achieved.

In your opinion, is the current arrangement	
of recovering 75% and 25% of transmission	
network costs from suppliers and	
generators respectively appropriate?	Response
	Renewable generators are already subsidising the development of grid infrastructure through
Inappropriate	the group processing scheme. 25% is too high.
	There is no economic foundation for this. The costs recovered are 100% fixed and sunk.
	Generators ultimately have to recover costs from customers. Therefore it is more
Inappropriate	economically efficient to charge customers 100% of the costs directly.
	100% from Supliers assuming no postalisation - The capacity POT at present incoporates
	TUoS. If the split was to be amended to 100% from Suppliers it would reduce the capacity
	POT with the net result being no impact on customers. The purpose of this would be to
Inappropriate	smooth the Capacity POT for Generators and increase price stability.
Inappropriate	90:10
Inappropriate	50/50 but only so long as the generator is correctly signalled.
	Synergen would prefer to see all TUOS costs allocated to suppliers – a 100:0 split. It does
	not believe that TUOS charges seen by generators are well recompensed through CPM and
	cannot be bid in. To the extent that charges are passed on, the initial charging to generators
	in an un-necessary step pre socialisation via retailers. To the extent that these costs are not
	recovered, this is inequitable and restrictive to an efficient generator. If the split remains
	75:25 Synergen would favour a postage stamping of TUOS based on registered capacity (as
Inappropriate	network costs need to reflect the capacity of a generator, not its annual output).
Inappropriate	100% allocation to suppliers who can accurately pass cost through.

In your opinion, is the current arrangement	
of recovering 75% and 25% of transmission	
network costs from suppliers and	
generators respectively appropriate?	Response
Inappropriate	100% on suppliers if their is a flat charge
Appropriate	
	Given that it is largely driven by the EU requirements, there must be a split. However it is
Appropriate	difficult to comment on the precise proportion.
Appropriate	
	Split would appear to be appropriate, although there may be a case for suppliers to pay a
Appropriate	larger percentage of network costs.
Appropriate	
Appropriate	Assuming the locational charge structure is changed
Appropriate	

At present generators connected to	
the distribution system with installed	
capacity less than 10MW do not have	
to pay Generator TUoS tariffs. In	
your opinion is this threshold	
reasonable?	Response
Yes	
Yes	There has to be some cut off point; 10 MW is quite low so it seems reasonable.
Yes	
Yes	

At present generators connected to	
the distribution system with installed	
capacity less than 10MW do not have	
to pay Generator TUoS tariffs. In	
your opinion is this threshold	
reasonable?	Response
Yes	
Yes	For generators just over the 10MW threshold, a graduated scheme should be considered
Yes	
Yes	
Yes	
	The threashold for Large Scale Versus Small Scale wind generation under REFIT is 5MW and as such
	this threshold of 5MW is suggested to be a more appropriate threshold for the application of
No	generator TUoS charges.

At present generators connected to	
the distribution system with installed	
capacity less than 10MW do not have	
to pay Generator TUoS tariffs. In	
your opinion is this threshold	
reasonable?	Response
	It should be based on the energy generated, not the capacity to generate. The idea that smaller
	wind-farms are subsidised by larger ones does not make business sense. Also, it creates a market
No	anomaly at the threshold and encourages development of windfarms of 9.99MW.
	In this situation BGE are unsure as to who is paying how much. There may be a large number of
	generators connected to the distribution system with installed capacity less than 10MW who do not
	pay Generator TUoS tariffs, consequently they may be benefiting disproportionately due to size. It
	would be informative if these figures were available. Also it should be considered to what degree the
	generator is embedded in the local network. In the case of CHP we believe a derogation should
	apply assuming it is serving local load. Further to this with the recent introduction of a feed in tariff
	for Micro Generation as the system moves more towards distributed generation the burden for TUoS
No	will fall to a greater extent on a smaller number of large gnerators
	An appropriate threshold is zero MW, i.e. all generators should pay TUoS charges. If a postalised
No	tariff is adopted, then all generators should be treated equally.
	It it not clear what may be reasonable and it will depend on the potential connection policies in
	future. For example if there is a lot of small renewables all connected at a distribution level but
	which in aggregate export via the transmission network, then this may not represent cost-reflective
No	charging.

At present generators connected to	
the distribution system with installed	
capacity less than 10MW do not have	
to pay Generator TUoS tariffs. In	
your opinion is this threshold	
reasonable?	Response
	Synergen believes that the threshold should be significantly lower, perhaps as low as 100kW.
	Rationale: • 10MW is not capable of being robustly defended – historic figure that probably
	seemed "about the right level" and cut out only a small number of players at the time it was
	established. • Increasing levels of smaller schemes shifts the balance of total cost spayed by larger
	players going forwards – this is not equitable. • If small players get CPM payments directly (or
	should sensibly capture such benefits via sales prices to retailers) then they should be exposed to
	the cost of the network in the same manner as other players. By this Synergen means where an off-
	market sale reduces a suppliers pool volumes, and thus its CPM costs. NB – for clarity, Synergen's
	position is that (a) TUOS should be all on the demand side, but IF it is not, then there should be only
No	very limited exclusions on the generators side from contributing to the generators share.

Should new entrants be treated in the	
same way as existing generators with	
respect to Generator TUoS charges?	Response
	Fairness /Equity is key; having differing arrangements for new entrants would contradict this key
Yes	principle.
Yes	
Yes	

Should new entrants be treated in the	
same way as existing generators with	
respect to Generator TUoS charges?	Response
Yes	
Yes	Avoids undue discrimination.
Yes	
	The objective is to minimise incremental network investment costs whilst serving demand and
	maintaining security of supply. All generator entry and exits should be considered on this same
Yes	basis.
	Investment choices were taken using the present charging methodology despite its volatile nature.
Yes	New entrants should not be unduly penalised under a new methodology.
	In the interests of fairness all generators should be treated in the same manner. It is difficult to
Yes	envisage a scenario where new entrants could justifiably be treated differently.
	In general yes. However, as previously noted, we believe the matter of deep vs shallow connection
	policies should be re-appraised as it is not clear the current model delivers the least cost overall
Yes	outcome.
Yes	
Yes	
Yes	
Yes	

Should new entrants be treated in the	
same way as existing generators with	
respect to Generator TUoS charges?	Response
	Our ideal model would be one were all generators pay a socilaised charge that is predictable and
	stable. Were there are significant costs associated with enhancements to the network or other
	factors that increase the overall cost of the network these should be passed through to the
	customer. This is on the basis that these additional costs are approved by the Regulatory Authorities
	and therefore will either be necessary spends in terms of network integrity or will be enhancements
	to the network. Similarly, if the investment signals are correct, a new entrant should be beneficial to
	customers. It would seem to us to be a distortion that a new entrant should be penalised or, worse
	still, incumbants are forced to pick up the costs of connecting a new entrant. We would therefore
	propose a system based on generators paying a flat TUoS charge and any additional costs are
Yes	passed to customers through suppliers.
	In principle, if the appropriate market structures are working efficiently, there should be no need to
Yes	give new generators special treatment, as this could potentially distort the market
Yes	Any other approach is discriminatory
Yes	This is required for fairness
	No – new entrants should not have the ability to unfavorably move TUOS charges for existing
	generators through poor locational drivers or decisions. TUOS charges for a generator should not be
	able to rise the year after construction starts - ideally there should be a hold period of perhaps 10
No	years to protect investment decisions.
	The old stock has historic inflexibilities that are neither cost effective or necessary at this point in
	time to be changed. New entrants must be guided / incentivised or penalised into coming up with
No	solutions that meet the needs of the system both electrically and economically.

Should new entrants be treated in the	
same way as existing generators with	
respect to Generator TUoS charges?	Response
	I have lobbied the CER for several years in relation to this point (TLAF). I think the CER took my
	view on board in Clause 9 of the terms of contract for Tynagh. I have consistently maintained that
	an exisiting or new generator should not have its TLAF worsened by the arrival of a further new
	entrant; this breaces the principle of the polluter pays, i.e. if the most recent new entrant causes
No	higher losses then it should bear the cost of these through its TLAF
	In principle, all users of the network should pay a certain level of charges, in line with their peers,
	regardless of size. Such users could pay an alternative tarrif structure, as is the case with smaller
No	gas consumers in relation to Use of System charges for gas capacity
	Nat Grid in GB has found that increasing embedded generation has affected flows on the
	transmission system. All generation has an effect – even if it is just displacing imports to the
No	Distribution system. All generation should contribute to Transmission costs.

Appendix C

Comments on Demand/Supplier Questions

In your opinion, which aspects of the current	
Demand/Supplier TUoS methodology should be:	
Retained	Removed
Postalised appraoch	All TUoS charges should be recovered from demand customers
	The 25% - 75% split should be made 100% levied on demand customers
No comment	No comment
Energy charge	Capacity charge
charges should remain in place	locational charges should be revised
Tariff level effect	
Keep tariffs socalised on a jurisdictional basis. There is a	
contradiction however if nererator TUoS is locational.	Increase the 75% allocation to 100%
No Comment at this time	No Comment at this time
n/a	
postalised approach	all TuOS should be recovered from demand customers as this is a more stable signal
	Generator 25 % / Supplier 75% recovery split

In your opinion, which aspects of the current Demand/Supplier TUoS methodology should be:	
Retained	Removed
Service charges	Infracture charges
na	na
Retain Energy Charges	
	CMC and site-specific demand. Portfolio effect matters, not individual sites.
	Suppliers will pass on demand impact through tariffs. T charges should deliver T
Incentives required to use system effectively. A charge	objectives. Currently T charges address gen capacity issues as well, but there is an
should be levied based on demand at system peak	SEM with demand side and other options

In your opinion should a harmonized all-island arrangement be	
used for determining Demand/Supplier TUoS tariffs?	<u>Response</u>
Yes	Consistant with SEM objectives
Yes	

In your opinion should a harmonized all-island arrangement be	
used for determining Demand/Supplier TUoS tariffs?	Response
	This is the ideal but must be subject to the criteria set out below and
Yes	subject to industry consultation on the actual detail
	We all gain from having a bigger system, so we should all pay for this
Yes	equally.
Yes	Benefit to infrastructure
	Consistency is important to avoid any anomilies between the two
Yes	jurisdictions which may arise from two different systems.
	On balance, this would be simplier for stakeholder understanding.
	However, it is not essential. As set out earlier, different policy
	objectives may exist in each jurisdiction for network development and
Yes	therefore different cost allocation may be appropriate.
	For the SEM to function effectively arrangements should be
Yes	harmonised in a equitable and fair manner.
Yes	
Yes	To meet SEM objectives
Yes	To minimise possibility of developing unnatural constraint payments.
Yes	They are interconnected

In your opinion should a harmonized all-island arrangement be	
used for determining Demand/Supplier TUoS tariffs?	<u>Response</u>
Yes	
	It would make it easier to offer Customers a similar product both sides
Yes	of the border
	Different approaches in the two jurisdictions would distort dispatch
	and pricing in the SEM - through TLAFs. TLAFs are part of TUoS
Yes	charges because they levy significant costs on generators.

In addition to the list above, what other objectives should be taken into account when determining the Demand/Supplier TUoS	
methodology?	
Stable allocation to suppliers, clearly defined settlement process	
Cost Minimisation - very important Direct and relevant costs only included - important	
The tariff should be as simple and easily understood.	

In addition to the list above, what other objectives should be taken into account when determining the Demand/Supplier TUoS	
methodology?	
Renewables promotion.	
Economic efficiency - see earlier.	
An Objective to maximise the uptake of wind onto the system through a possible rebalancing of Generator / Supplier ratio with a pass back	
arrangement to wind generators that can be dispatched. [Assuming technological developments prove up in time]	
Suppliers/customers should be able to understand the incentives in the tariff, otherwise they cannot be expected to respond. Objectives of	
charging structure need to be clear and simple.	

In your opinion, with a shallow connection charge regime in place, would a postage stamp i.e. uniform	
charge, be appropriate on the island of Ireland?	Response_
	The nature of the application/model is one that is best suited to a postalised
Yes	methodology
Yes	
Yes	See. 5. above
	As stated earlier, locational charging will not deliver on the stated objective if it
Yes	is based on sunks costs.
Yes	Refer to Generator TUoS comments.
Yes	We are not convinced with the merits of shallow connection charging generally, but for consistency reasons if it does not apply for generators, then it should

In your opinion, with a shallow connection charge regime in place, would a postage stamp i.e. uniform charge, be appropriate on the island of Ireland?	<u>Response</u>
	not apply for demand customers.
Yes	
Yes	
	See answer to previous question. What purpose is served by complexity that is
	not easily understood? What does cost-reflectivity mean in the context of a
Yes	large, shared facility with costs that are almost entirely fixed?
No	
	Facilities in remote places should pay more than those local to where the
No	network is strong.
No	
No	
No	Loss of signal power.
No	

In your opinion, is the current arrangement of recovering 75%	
and 25% of transmission network costs from suppliers and	
generators respectively appropriate?	Response
No	100% from suppliers who can accurately allocate the costs
No	100% demand/supplier
No	100% to Suppliers, or at least 90%. Better Transparency achieved
No	50% and 50%
	A higher charge for suppliers, as generators already subsidise the
No	developement of the grid through group processing
No	Should be 100% on customers for reasons of economic efficiency.
	100% Supplier - assuming customers are cost neutral as a result of a
No	reduction in the capacity Pot as per the comments on Generator TUoS.
No	
No	100% from suppliers who can accurately pass the cost through
No	50 / 50 but pass back to firm delivery wind generators
No	50-50
Yes	
Yes	

In your opinion, is the current arrangement of recovering 75% and 25% of transmission network costs from suppliers and generators respectively appropriate?	<u>Response</u>
Yes	
Yes	

Do you believe that Demand/Supplier	
TUoS should be based on the following:	Response
	Promotes demand with better load factor, allows fair treatment of recovery of costs for demand
Capacity and Energy	customers with low consumption but high maximum demand.
	The regime as exists today. Similar to the gas regime on the Island. No strong argument to
Capacity and Energy	change.
	An incentive is required to encourage users to use the network efficiently; ie to maximise their load
	factor and avoid unnecessary peaks. All users need to make a contribution towards operational
	costs and these are reasonably attributable to usage. Therefore a tariff that contains both
	elements can incentivise both peak demand and consumption efficiency. Introduction of smart
	metering will increase flexibility of individual customer response to pricing signals, so T tariff
Capacity and Energy	structure must allow customers to benefit from responding to T tariff incentives.

Response
Revenue recovery should relate to fixed and variable costs.
Promotes demand with better load factor, allows fair treatment of recovery of costs for demand
customers with low consumption but high maximum demand.
Need to encourage firm wind power.
The wires business is by its nature a capacity business. The costs to any T&D business have little
reflection on the amount of energy that flows assuming things like overloading and losses are
disregarded in the context of this question. MWh type parameters currently used in UoS are simply

Do you believe that Demand/Supplier	
TUoS should be based on the following:	Response
	derived from source MVA or MW parameters.
Capacity only	Costs are fixed and largely sunk. They do not vary with demand.
Energy only	
Energy only	We should pay for what we transport through the system.
	Energy is not about potential generation, the amount used is the important number. The charges
	are called Use of System charges, so that is what they should charge for. If they are based on
Energy only	capacity, they become a development charge.
Energy only	To facilitate ease of application to customer tariffs

In your opinion, if the costs of serving different locations differ, is it reasonable that different demand	
charges are applied to different locations?	Response
Yes	
	Facilities in remote places should pay more than those local to where the network
Yes	is strong.

In your opinion, if the costs of serving different	
locations differ, is it reasonable that different demand	
charges are applied to different locations?	Response
Νο	Appraoch would be unstable
	Whilst the intuitively correct answer is 'yes' the more important thing is that TUoS
No	charging simply lends itself to a postalised approach.
	Very complex to implement such a system, if a regime could be agreed as to how
	to achieve it. Further given the sparce population distribution throughout the
	Island such a regime would unduly burden some, and favour others. In the gas
No	regime on the island no such regime is utilised.
	Because that is a mechanism that will penalise development of any type in areas
	that have a poor electrical infrastructure. The fact that the system developer has
	failed to produce a grid that is uniformly adequate should not be a driver or barrier
	to industrial development in particular areas. The grid operator needs to take
	responsibility for failures in certain areas, not those who wish to create
No	employment.
	A geographical retail tariff would be extremely difficult to implement and may
	impact particular groups of customers who are not in a position to do anything to
No	mitigate any resulting additional cost
	For reasons of fairness if the costs of serving different locations differ demand
	charges should not be applied on this basis as this would geographically
	discriminate against these locations which are located further away from the grid.
No	This would go against the regulatory authorities stated principle that the

In your opinion, if the costs of serving different locations differ, is it reasonable that different demand	
charges are applied to different locations?	Response
	methodology be non-discriminatory.
No	
	We undestand the broader societal benefits of having a postalised approach. The
	unstable nature of locational signals could result in inequity between customers. It
No	is also appropriate however that the same equity is afforded to generators.
No	
No	
	Assumption that modelling reflects reality. Joint cost allocations are arbitrary.
No	Issues of policies on social cohesion. Potential for unintended outcomes. etc etc.

Please add any other comments that you think should be considered by the System Operators in relation to Demand/Supplier TUoS tariff arrangements.

We understand the broader societal benefits of having a postalised approach. Unstable locational signals could result in inequity between customers. It is also appropriate however for the same equity to be afforded to generators.

To the extent there are similar issues on the gas regime what has been done in the gas regime should be looked at and considered, given that a common approach to gas and electricity appears correct in relation to some issues.

none

We have set out why we think locational charges are not appropriate. However, if they are to be continued, then there must be a consistent approach across both generation and demand.

"Triad" charges are one way of charging for capacity. The effect is felt more widely because customers are uncertain as to when the peaks will happen and therefore moderate their consumption when they fear they will be hit by charges. However there is an argument that more than three charging periods are required to maintain the load reduction incentive over the whole winter period (or perhaps to control demand during other periods when network capacity is constrained). This mechanism would avoid the need for complex and administratively onerous winter peak demand reduction schemes, where there is always a possibility of customes being paid for something they would do anyway.

Appendix D

Comments on Transmission Loss Adjustment Factors & Losses

Which aspects of the current TLAF methodology, if any, do you believe should be retained or removed?

Marginal loss signal is too volatile, and should be removed. Generators that reduce losses may be penalised. The current methodology is too complex and EirGrid are the really the only party that can complete studies and projections, therefore the methodology lacks transparency and predictability. In addition there is no meaningful investment or operational signal provided. Currently there is a danger is that if you listen to a signal, you could be punished by causing a reverse flow which cannot be predicted, and we believe that the signal has been broken since the start of the wind industry in Ireland. There is a case for retaining the TLAF signal for price making plant to gain a better dispatch, but there would need to be much more granular and uncorrected loss data available to ensure this was applied fairly. The cost of creating this level of detail should be compared with the benefit of a slightly improved dispatch.

Localised TLAF serve no purpose except to increase the project risk for new generation.

The locational component is too unstable and unpredictable and TLAF's increases cost to consumers by raising generator investment costs.

Like TUoS charges losses in the Tx system should be postalised. There is no justification for complexity around the current methods because it does not achieve the desired effect

The current TLAF regime is unsuitable for the current environment on the Island. The current arrangement is inaccurate and unfair as it applies marginal losses to all volumes. Please see separate response to consultation

Remove locational charging.

N/A

See my earlier comment

Which aspects of the current TLAF methodology, if any, do you believe should be retained or removed?

We believe that the current locational TLAF methodology should be abandoned and all generators given the same average TLAF because: 1. Determination, based on modelled marginal flows for assumed dispatch scenarios is very inaccurate and therefore unfair. Also results in uneconomic dispatch. 2. Volatility, lack of predictability and subjectivity results in a higher cost of capital and the need for a high degree of regulation. At a very minimum, because 50% of the losses are fixed, these should be socalised across all demand. If the other 50% is to be localised, then demand must also be included (the proposal for BETTA has 55% of these costs localised across demand).

The volatility element of the TLAFs should be removed. Where investment choices are made based on a TLAF provided by the system operator, those TLAFs should be maintained for the life of the project. Large annual adjustment of TLAFs introduces unacceptable regulatory and commercial risk to investments.

When making long term generation investment decisions it is crucial that all cost and revenue inputs may be accurately modelled over a long period (10+ years). The only time that a generator can respond to a locational signal is at the time the investment is made, i.e. when the generator is constructed and commissioned. Once this has taken place, it is then impossible to further respond to a locational signal. Similar to TUoS charges, under the current system of TLAF charges it is impossible to predict what the TLAF for a given generator will be annually, as they could be subject to considerable change each year. The potential reasons for such change in local TLAF are largely out of the control of the generator – for example more generation could be commissioned in the locality, or there could be a large reduction in demand locally. This potential volatility makes it very difficult for generators to accurately determine what their TLAF is likely to be over a period of time, and leads to increased uncertainty at the time of making investment decisions. Additionally, once the generator is commissioned it's revenue stream is then at the mercy of these swings in TLAF, over which it has no influence, at which time it is too late to change it's locational behaviour. The aspects of the methodology that contribute to this volatility should be reduced or removed. It is imperative that whatever methodology is put in place the TLAF is reasonably predictable for long periods, and is stable.

As we have commented upon in all consultations on TLAFs, the current factors seem to disproportionately disadvantage NI generators with no offsetting benefit for NI customers. We consider all locational elements should be removed and consideration given to unitising TLAFs

Remove the 100% loading on generators and allocate some element of losses to suppliers and TSOs / SOs.

Which aspects of the current TLAF methodology, if any, do you believe should be retained or removed?
The locational nature of TLAFs is increasing cost to consumers by raising generator investment risks. The locational component is not possible to
accurately predict and is a non-diversifiable risk.
Methodology needs to be completely reworked
None
none
The year on year volatility of TLAFs is unacceptable, and needs to be addressed in the harmonised all-island mechanism
The lack of transparency and variation year on year should be removed. TLAFs should be predictable and more stability needed.
Some adjustments based on a Carbon weighting could be introduced.

Do you believe that	Comment
Locational Signals are	
an important element	
of TLAFs?	
No	Locational signals indicated by TLAFs are in direct contradiction to the Gate 3 process which is based on connection
	application date which specifies precisely where the generation to be located. It does not seem to make sense to try to
	overlay carefully selected Gate 3 offers with an additional and sometimes contrary locational signal. Historically the
	TLAF system has been so broken that developers have ignored it, and even if the locational signal aspect was fixed
	now (by making it less volatile and more predictable), all the wind farms that are going to be developed for the next
	15-20 years have already chosen a location, and been assigned a grid queue position, either in Gate 3 or Gate 4. From
	our discussions with developers, none of the developers took TLAF into account when selecting particular sites over
	others. It is important to note that the current mechanism is adding significantly to the cost of generation
	development in Ireland. This is completely out of proportion to the potential benefit of the signal. A cost benefit study
	of TLAFS could show: Benefits: - Reduction of losses by an average of xMW per hour. Costs: - Time required by
	EirGrid to calculate, publish check input to settlement and deal with queries on TLAFS? - Time required by industry to
	analyse model, forecast, explain to investors. Increase in the risk factor applied to all projects that their TLAF might
	decrease. It is difficult to see how this could lead to an overall benefit even if the method fully achieved its
	objectives.
No	Like TUOS charges the uncertainly around the calculation only goes to increase project risk. A simple method could
	greatly reduce project risk
No	Above
No	There is only so far that you can go with this type of approach - its the wrong approach for the application

Do you believe that	Comment
Locational Signals are	
an important element	
of TLAFs?	
No	Stronger locational signals are given by (i) TSOs grid reinforcement plans (e.g. Grid25) (ii) wind generators locating
	where wind blows best (iii) due to planning and connection restrictions the redevelopment of brown field sites are
	favoured. Please see separate response to consultation
No	The answer above is meant to be interpreted in the sense that they should not be an element of TLAFs. The question
	should have been structured so. They are currently an important element and this should not be the case. The grid
	operator needs to develop the grid in a forward-looking fashion, and that should not penalise those who wish to
	develop renewable energy generation stations in areas where the grid is weak and under-developed.
No	They will only be effective if generators have confidence in them and they are stable and predictable. For a small
	system however it is very difficult to achieve this without losing economic efficiency. In any case, the decision on
	where best to locate has already signalled by EirGrid via its Grid 25 investment programme.
No	Presently other signals such as land, access to water, proximity to the electricity grid and gas network are more
	important locational signals than TLAFs as the current TLAF methodology is ineffectual for investment purposes.
	Using TLAFs as a locational signal is inappropriate particularly in the new environment due to the necessity of wind to
	locate in certain areas. Incumbent Generators, who have a large geographical spread, will have a competitive
	advantage over new entrants.
No	In the current climate of investment in both generation and the transmission and distribution network it is hard to
	justify the inclusion of locational signals as part of TLAFs. Wind generators have little real choice as to where they
	locate on the system for two main reasons: • The primary locational factors for wind generators are the availability
	of the wind resource, and planning permissions. The location of the best wind regimes cannot be altered, so

Do you believe that	Comment
Locational Signals are	
an important element	
of TLAFs?	
	generation must move to these areas • When wind generators apply to be connected to the network in a given
	location they are instructed as part of the gate process of connection by Eirgrid/ESB Networks as to which node on the
	system they must connect to. With the current gates as they stand even if the generator wishes to move to an area
	with a better locational signal (i.e. more favourable TLAF and TUoS charges) they will effectively be precluded from
	doing so for years, as the gates are processed in date order, and the generators new application will be at the back of
	the queue. The real choice of the generator is very limited by these long connection lead times. Further to this, if the
	generator were finally successful in moving location to an area with a better signal, there is every chance that this
	signal could have changed significantly for the worse by the time the generator is actually connected to the system.
	The above factors are the main locational drivers for generators, and it is fair to say that the locational element of
	generator TLAFs tariffs have minimal impact on the decisions of generators. It is difficult enough for generators to
	locate their sites according to the above criteria, without the additional penalising factors of volatile locational signals
	being applied through use of system charges. It is worth considering a postalised type loss factor for TLAFs. This
	would reduce volatility, and would be a more equitable means of recouping losses, given that as outlined above, the
	locational element of TLAFs have minimal influence over where generators actually locate.
No	TLAFs have no impact once a generator locates and under the current regime, a generator has no control over how the
	TLAF may vary over time and is subject to the decisions of others (be they demand exit, generator entry or
	transmission investment)

Do you believe that	Comment
Locational Signals are	
an important element	
of TLAFs?	
No	For reasons set out in q2 above.
No	As per TUoS charges locational TLAFs attempt to impose a deterministic solution on a variable problem. Generators
	cannot respond to changing locational signals and should not be punished as a result.
No	They are superseded by other strategies
No	As per TUoS charges, the duration of the grid connection process and project development life cycles coupled with the
	granularity of the market which gives rise to significant volatility in TUoS and TLAFs, completely undermine the basis
	for these mechanisms giving an effective locational signal
No	TLAFs are based on a deterministic solution to a stochastic problem. The calculation is opaque and the scenarios are
	arbitrary. Joint cost allocation problems are ALWAYS subjective. If there is any alteration to the losses attributed to
	one generator due to new generators at the other end of the island, then the marginal losses actually belong to the
	send generator and not to the first, but this is not how the process is operated. Also it is unfair to apply marginal
	losses to the entire output of a generator if the system becomes constrained at some level of output near the
	maximum export level. System capacity includes the concept of firmness, which gives priority to those generators
	connected first. TLAFs are inconsistent with this approach, since they penalise both generators at a node, even if one
	of them was in place long before the second. See also answer to previous question

Do you believe that	Comment
Locational Signals are	
an important element	
of TLAFs?	
No	They are currently too volatile and do not work, that the two new CCGTs in Cork as an example, when they decided to
	construct in this area and it is now negative because they did locate there.
No	Other locational signals take priority such as planning and environmental consents.
Yes	Yes, as if the financial impact of the transmission network is not factored into generator siting decisions, consumers will be obliged to pay for network improvements without any mechanism for motivating generators to minimise the
	associated cost impact.
Yes	Yes, in the absence of LMP, then TLAFs represent a static type of LMP; as stated earlier locational give the right
	economic signals and this makes good sense when energy efficiency is a primary concern (lower transmission losses)
Yes	In a market that seeks to adopt cost reflective principles (as in some respects the SEM seeks to) so that the differential values of generation that meets demand (i.e. its delivered value to customers) and the cost of taking
	demand locationally are reflected in the payments to providers of services and consumers of electricity. Under the
	SEM design, the generator sale occurs at the commercial boundary – and it has no control over the costs of delivery
	beyond that point. This consequently represents the limit of a locational signal that can be sent to a generator.
Yes	n/a

Do you believe that	Comment
Locational Signals are	
an important element	
of TLAFs?	
Yes	To encourage a more optimal system assuming that wind remains the most economic source of bulk renewable energy
Yes	

In your opionion is it reasonable that	Response
losses be attributed on the basis they	
are incurred?	
No	TLAFs for existing generators can be significantly impacted by the appearance & disappearance
	of load which leads to huge lack of predictability in the system Losses are an inevitable
	consequence of running an electricity system, as for example are ancillary services, which are
	not attributed on the basis they are incurred. You could just as easily argue that the load is in
	the "wrong" place. They can also be impacted by the actions of the TSO and other generators. It
	is not clear if there is any monitoring of actual transmission losses and the "basis that they are
	incurred". If this were to be the case the increased losses caused by delays in network
	reinforcement should also be considered.
No	Good economic theory would require that losses be attributed on the basis they are incurred
	however in practice this is extremely hard and appears to lead to counter intuitive results.
No	Allocation of losses for individual generators involves too many fudge factors.
No	As per a previous answer the intuitively correct answer is yes but doesn't fit the correct overall
	methodology. The total Tx losses can be calculated and should be applied in a postalised
	approach
No	There is no simple answer to this question. Please see separate response to consultation
No	They are not the fault of the user (generator or consumer). They are the fault of the grid being
	developed without adequate planning. Because of the location of the weaknesses in the National
	Grid, to do so will penalise and hinder the development of wind generation, which is contrary to
	the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources' position and Ireland's stated
	position in Europe.

In your opionion is it reasonable that	Response
losses be attributed on the basis they	
are incurred?	
No	Unless we can accurately meter losses, it is not reasonable or fair to attribute costs based on
	modelling which is materially flawed. The main reason for this is that the modelling is not based
	on populating the network from the ground up with blocks of generation. The marginal approach
	results in generators in a particular location being "tarred with the same brush" for all load
	blocks. Also the dispatch scenarios do not represent real life. Finally, there is a fundamental
	error in populating the network and then measuring TLAF for each generator by varying
	aggregate demand by 5 MWs (we explained this point in an earlier e-mail).
No	Losses should not be attributed as they are incurred because there are fluctuations in factors
	which are outside the control of the generators e.g. new connections which alter the demand in
	particular areas. This would also be inappropriate in the developing Irish energy market due to
	the fact that renewable generation must locate where the wind is and should not be penalised for
	doing so.
No	There is generally a rationale for attributing costs where they lie. However as losses are dynamic
	and will vary with each additional unit produced or consumed, the complexity of determining
	losses as they are incurred may be such that a simpler solution is more appropriate.
No	In principle it is fair to say that losses should be attributed according to how they are incurred. In
	terms of priorities however this is less critical than the need for predictability and reduced
	volatility. Arbitrary changes in the network after a generators investment decision is made can
	then lead to disimprovement their TLAF and/or TUoS charges. As mentioned in previous answers
	generators have little real choice as to where they locate, and if they are in certain areas, they
	could be very heavily penalised by their TLAF changing for example, and once commissioned,
	they cannot change their behaviour in relation to locational signals. So while in principle the

In your opionion is it reasonable that	Response
losses be attributed on the basis they	
are incurred?	
	sentiment is reasonable, in practice it is difficult to implement this in a manner that enables
	generators to make long term investment decisions based on predictable revenue streams.
No	While the total historic loss in the system is relatively easy to measure, the allocation of these
	losses to individual generators is, in our opinion, suspect.
No	It is impossible to meter losses and therefore attribute them accurately and fairly
No	More analysis required to confirm this
No	Simple loss attribution may cause an outweighing of a systemic advantage signalled through the
	TUoS.
No	It is unreasonable to attribute losses incurred by a generator, where significant changes in the
	network topology, due to new generation, unit retirements, grid developments and changes in
	the geographical pattern of consumption which have occurred since that generator commenced
	operations have impacted negatively on his marginal loss factor
Yes	
Yes	Let the polluter pay
Yes	This is a complex nested problem and therefore answering this question with a straight "YES /
100	NO" isn't appropriate. Whilst, at the highest level, it may seem reasonable for losses to be
	attributed on the basis that they are incurred, the application of this principle will be problematic
	with respect to both the overall level of losses, and any costs reflective dynamic allocation. The

In your opionion is it reasonable that	Response
losses be attributed on the basis they	
are incurred?	
	overall level of losses Given that the overall level of losses is driven not just by the location of
	generation but also by the location of centres of demand as well as by actions by the TSOs / SOs
	e.g. constraint management. Consequently, Synergen believes that there needs to be
	appropriate incentives on the TSOs to minimise losses – where it is efficient to do so i.e. (a)
	minimising losses did not give rise to incurring other costs (where there is no incentive to
	minimise such costs) and (b) that any cost incurred by the TSO were not ultimately recovered
	from participants through TSO charges. This could be through specific price controls, or
	potentially the TLAF cost allocation. Exposure to "losses as incurred" Regarding the allocation
	of losses "as incurred" this principle could be interpreted in a number of ways, but implies a full
	dynamic allocation of costs (potentially on a marginal basis). Synergen would not favour this
	because, as noted above, the level of losses and the differentials in marginal losses particularly,
	could be driven by factors (a) outside the control of the generator, (b) reflect constraint costs
	that arise in part through the energy pricing mechanism, and (c) occur beyond the commercial
	boundary. Subject to incentives to reduce losses Synergen believes that TLAFs should seek to
	reflect locational values (at the commercial boundary) equally between generation and demand.
	For the avoidance of doubt, Synergen would not be in favour of dynamic losses.
Yes	
Yes	
Yes	Losses can be included in generators energy bid. Under the current system, TLAFs are relatively
	easy to model and therefore their impact can be accounted for as part of a generators

In your opionion is it reasonable that	Response
losses be attributed on the basis they	
are incurred?	
	investment assessment.
Yes	Absolutely the case - if it could be done correctly. But no-one can unequivocally attribute losses
	on a complex system, where demand changes as well as generation and dispatch depends on
	fuel price relativities that can change significantly. Application of a subjective, scenario-based
	model to this type of problem lacks any credibility. As previously stated, just because a sum can
	be done doesn't mean it's the right sum to do. TLAFs are nice in theory, but unfair and random in
	practical impact. They add risk to projects. If TLAFs were stable they MIGHT influence locational
	decisions. See previous comments on the value of randomly variable incentives in the context of
	long term investment decisions.
Yes	It would be reasonable if the signal was predictable, low risk, simple.

In your opinion, should a harmonized all-	Comment
island arrangement be used for determining	
TLAFs?	
Yes	Where harmonisation of arrangements are possible, then that should always be the objective, and clearly two otherwise equal price making generators located north and south should not be advantaged or disadvantaged solely on their choice of jurisdiction.
Yes	Harmonization of charges across both jurisdictions is part of the objectives of the AIM.
Yes	in line with SEM policy
Yes	Same as a previous answer
Yes	This is an ideal, assuming the criteria below are met, and the regime is subject to industry consultation as to the detail.
Yes	A larger grid will be less susceptible to volatility. Due diligence should be undertaken if it is to occur, to ensure that the systems are compatible and that weaknesses do not exist on a system being integrated into the National Grid.
Yes	Consistency is important to avoid any anomolies between two jurisdictions which may arise from two different systems.
Yes	I suggest that in order to get best out of the SEM we should harmonise as many aspects as possible. This seems the right thing to do from an intuitive sense - but perhaps all-island system modelling would should otherwise - but I don't think so.

In your opinion, should a harmonized all-	Comment
island arrangement be used for determining	
TLAFs?	
Yes	Given that transmission losses are variable costs, they affect dispatch and dynamic
	economic efficiency. Therefore, we must apply the same approach all-island.
Yes	As already stated in Section 2, Question 3 and Section 3, Question 3, for the SEM to
	function effectively arrangements should be harmonised in an equitable and fair manner.
Yes	As we are now in an all island market for both energy and capacity it is appropriate that all
	market charges be applied on an island wide basis. In the interests of fairness, and to
	demonstrate full commitment to an all island approach, it is appropriate that a common
	approach is taken, where there is convergence of elements that are not yet harmonised.
Yes	It is important that as payment mechanisms are harmonised, the treatment of elements of
	market design that impact on competitive position of generators, or their settlement
	revenue streams.
Yes	
Yes	To promote SEM objectives
Yes	As per TUoS charges, since generators are competing on an all island basis, the greater the
	harmonisation of charges levied in each jurisdiction, the better.
Yes	As the current market is harmonized, TLAFs should be similarly harmonized
Yes	In the interests of market equity.
Yes	
Yes	All competing on an equal footing.

In your opinion, should a harmonized all-	<u>Comment</u>
island arrangement be used for determining	
TLAFs?	
Yes	The same principle applies here as for TUoS charges, we should avoid any potential market
	distortions that may occur due to maintaining separate legacy mechanisms for TLAFs
Yes	Both jurisdictions should be treated the same for losses, otherwise dispatch and price
	formation will be distorted.
Yes	we now have an island market, it is only fair that as many rules and policies are
	harmonised
No	Again, many different factors, both legacy and future policy decisions may affect the losses
	in each jurisdiction and hence it may be difficult to establish equitable harmonised
	arrangements that do not involve some form of inter-jurisdictional transfer/subsidy

In addition to the list above, what other objectives should be taken into account when determining the TLAF methodology? Impact and interaction with the Strategic Grid Development through Grid 25 and the Gate 3 process. Both of which are mechanisms in place already that provide locational signals, or in fact prescribe the location of generation. The overall impact of the scheme on investment cost and administrative overhead should also be considered. none Cost minimisation - very important Direct and relevant costs included only - important System operators should be incentivised to minimise system losses. The promotion of Renewable Generation needs to be the primary objective of the system operator in order for it to be in compliance with the position of the Minister with responsibility for Energy policy in Ireland. Economic efficiency - see earlier. If the modelling assumptions and methodology are "rubbish" to begin with, then the results will also be "rubbish". Furthermore, there is a lack of transparency about how (and indeed if) generators are including TLAFs in bids. They also have only one marginal TLAF for all block loads and have to apply a variable loss which occurs after the station gate (unlike all other variable costs in bids). The net result is that dynamic economic efficiency is not achieved. Long term view - please refer to Generator TUoS section 2- Q.5. The development of a new methodology for TLAFs must consider the impact on previous and committed investments as well as the future for the Irish Grid development and future industrial landscape. The objective of aiding the achievement of Government and EU renewable generation targets should be taken into account when determining the methodology used. The locational constraints placed on wind should also be borne in mind. n/a Reduced complexity; based on reality e.g. real dispatch; reduced administrative costs

In addition to the list above, what other objectives should be taken into account when determining the TLAF methodology?

The TSO's role in minimising system losses through appropriate dispatch patterns should be addressed.

Credibility with users. Effectiveness in delivering a rational locational signal. Whether the effect of load changes can be isolated. The point at which system capacity constraints create a sudden increase/decrease in marginal losses and creation of an appropriate adjustment mechanism to correct "loss overcharge". Mechanism for ex-post reconciliation of outturn losses with attributed losses and settlement of the error. Full system metering to ensure accurate calculation of overall losses.

it should be simple, the existing methodology is rocket science

In your opinion, should	Comment
transmission losses be allocated	
<u>to:</u>	
demand/suppliers entirely	
demand/suppliers entirely	The cost of losses will eventually, and irrespective of the regulatory rules, arrive at the end customer. As they are priced in to generator bids customers currently pay for the cost of marginal losses. Allocating them to demand would be cheaper for consumers and simpler for generators.
demand/suppliers entirely	
demand/suppliers entirely	If 100% allocation to demand is not acceptable, at the very least follow the BETTA proposal. This is 50% (fixed losses) allocated to demand and remaining 50% variable losses allocated by location; 55% to demand and 45% to generation.
demand/suppliers entirely	

In your opinion, should	Comment
transmission losses be allocated	
<u>to:</u>	
shared between generators &	It should be borne more by the demand/suppliers, given that wind-generators are developing the
demand/suppliers	system at cost as part of the group processing scheme and that it is the fault of neither user.
shared between generators &	Generators: demand/suppliers about 5:1
demand/suppliers	
shared between generators &	50:50
demand/suppliers	
shared between generators &	
demand/suppliers	
shared between generators &	40:40 with the remainder allocated to TSOs / SOs.
demand/suppliers	
shared between generators &	25-75%
demand/suppliers	
demand/suppliers entirely	
shared between generators &	A similar ratio to TUoS charge allocation could be applied
demand/suppliers	
shared between generators &	10% generator and 90% supplier.
demand/suppliers	
shared between generators &	
demand/suppliers	
shared between generators &	50:50
demand/suppliers	

In your opinion, should	<u>Comment</u>
transmission losses be allocated	
<u>to:</u>	
shared between generators &	75/25 is as good as any split, but there is a good argument that demand users pay all costs in the end,
demand/suppliers	so consideration should be given to a 100/0 split as a more accurate representation of reality.
generators entirely	
generators entirely	

Please add other comments that you believe should be considered by the system operators in relation to Transmission Loss
Adjustment Factors.
It no longer makes sense to incentivise development of renewable generation in windless population centres instead of in locations with rich
wind resources. IWEA call for the removal of these non-value added location transmission connection incentives in context of strategic grid
development.
N/A
As customers ultimately pay for costs related to the operation of the system, applying any costs related to system losses to the
demand/supplier side entirely gives greater transparency.
Consideration needs to be given to the nature of wind farm development in terms of getting finance and the difficulty that an arbitrary
parameter imposes. The cost should be borne equally on an output basis. It seems that the application of TLAFs is disproportionate, given the
size of the grid.

Please add other comments that you believe should be considered by the system operators in relation to Transmission Loss Adjustment Factors.

Suppliers in general are not significantly impacted by the allocation of transmission loss factors. However, this is not the case with Error Supplier Units. A side effect of the setting of transmission loss factors is that the effect is magnified onto the error units. This has not been taken into consideration in this questionaire, but is a very important issue.

Regarding Q9 above, generators have by far more flexibility in terms of influencing the TLAF and transmission losses; however, demand customers through their location have some impact on this (but to a lessor extent - simply because load moves only incrementally while gens can be large blocks e.g. 440MW). On a separate point there will be serious thought to TUoS and TLAFs for wind; I suggest the same logical principles should apply, i.e. if a windfarm happens to be located close to a major load centre then it should enjoy the benefit of this through a higher TLAF. The windfarm that sites in a remote location to take advantage of high wind speeds should not feel disadvantaged by having a lower TLAF. If windfarms are to be compensated/.suported by other mechanisms there no problem - but it makes sense to have a single set of rules (subject to de minimus).

In BGE's opinion the current TLAF methodology is volatile, it undermines previous and current investment and is a disincentive to any future investment. It is impossible to predict what TLAF costs a generator will incur in the long run and consequently TLAFs cannot be used as a signal at the time of deciding on an investment location. For new investment we believe that a generator should maintain the TLAF in its location prior to its investment. If this is not feasible we believe a form of volatility mitigation is essential to support the development of a robust Generation and Supply electricity network. We rank our preferred solutions from 1-3 as follows; - New Investments maintain TLAF at time of investment decision (e.g. as of grid connection offer date) 1. Use the system average 2. Develop Zonal TLAFs for fixed periods 3. Develop Range for TLAFs with a Cap & Collar

In summary, ESB Wind Development believe that a uniform type TLAF should be applied across the SEM, rather than the current locational type methodology, as locational signals are largely irrelevant to where generation will actually be located. This is consistent with the connection methodology used in gate 3, where generators are connected in accordance with date of application, and no locational factors are applied. As outlined in previous answers, it is important to be conscious of the fact that generators cannot alter their locational behaviour once they are commissioned, and should not be subject to volatile TLAFs and TUoS charges after they have made their investment decision. A postalised/uniform type of methodology should be easier to implement, more transparent, and most importantly, stable and predictable over a

Please add other comments that you believe should be considered by the system operators in relation to Transmission Loss Adjustment Factors. long period (10+ years). A further factor that may need to be considered is the trading point, i.e. if all losses were allocated to demand, does that require the trading point to be moved to a virtual transmission busbar point. Whilst Synergen has answered the "acceptable / unacceptable" and "yes / No" questions, it is concerned that the stark choices set out do not fully reflect its views, nor the complexity of the issues. For example, Synergen has stated that the present TLAF arrangements are "acceptable" on the basis that it considers the arrangements to be broadly sensible albeit that Synergen has suggested changes to the TLAF arrangements. We could also have answered "unacceptable" to such a question on the basis that changes were suggested. A small change in TLAFs can totally alter the merit order of a conventional generator. A more efficient unit may end up behind less efficient units due to changes in TLAFs. This very significant impact should be taken into consideration. TLAFs should be transparent, predictable and stable. Is there a benefit in maintaining the daytime and night-time TLAF structure? The current structure adds a level of uncertainty and risk to generator bidding, particularly for lower merit plant with unpredictable market dispatch patterns. Stop flogging a dead horse. TLAFs have no credibility and do not provide any incentive for generators to do anything in particular. In the past TLAFs may have been useful, but in a world of significant new generation and grid development, they are highly volatile and consequently have no real credibility. They do not now provide any incentive for generators to do anything in particular. They provide an illusion of intellectual rigour that has no means of ex-post validation. See previous comments on project risk and issues of fairness. The best option is to remove TLAFs and add it onto demand losses. Demand customers would not be worse of as the TLAF would no longer be included in generators marginal costs and therefore reducing the SMP price to compensate for the increased losses applied to demand metered

Please add other comments that you believe should be considered by the system operators in relation to Transmission Loss
Adjustment Factors.
energy

Appendix E List of Respondents

Irish Cement Ltd Airtricity IWEA Constant Energy Eco Wind Power Ltd Rusal Aughinish Energia ESB **ESB** Independent Generation Saorgus Energy Ltd ConocoPhillips, Whitegate Refinery **Premier Power Limited** NIE Energy (Supply) Bord Gais Enercomm International AES ESB Wind Development NIE Energy Limited, Power Procurement Business Synergen Power Ltd Merck Sharp & Dohme Viridian Power and Energy Tynagh Energy Limited Bord na Móna Energy Ltd

Schering Plough (Brinny) Co Ltd First Electric Ltd Boliden Tara Mines Shannon LNG MASONITE IRELAND Moyle ESB Independent Energy Vayu SWS Lisheen Mine Irish Grid Solutions Quinn Group